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RECENT CASES
PROCEDURAL RIGHTS OF JUVENILES-CALIFORNIA
REQUIREMENT OF CORROBORATION OF ACCOMPLICE
TESTIMONY NOT APPLICABLE TO WARDSHIP PROCEED-
INGS IN JUVENILE COURT-In re R. C., 39 Cal. App. 3d 887,
114 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1974), hearing denied (August 28, 1974).
In the early morning hours of February 26, 1973, two San
Francisco police officers observed R.C. and J.J. engaging in activ-
ity which, upon further investigation, was found to be indicative
of an attempted entry into a building. Earlier that evening, R.C.
had been identified to one of the officers as a possible suspect
in a series of fires that had been set in the area.' The two boys
were taken into custody and questioned separately about a fire
in which two deaths had occurred. J.J. denied any knowledge
of the fire but admitted that he, D.B., and R.C. belonged to a
group called "The Flames," and that they had been responsible
for 14 or 15 other fires in the area. R.C. did not speak.
At the hearing on the petition against him, R.C. again chose
not to testify. It was stipulated, however, that minors D.B. and
J.J. would testify that they, along with R.C., had set fire to two
specific vacant buildings with the intent to burn them. It was also
stipulated that the fires set at the locations of the buildings were
incendiary in origin.'
It was determined that R.C. had violated the state law relat-
ing to arson,3 and he was committed to the California Youth Au-
thority.4
The appeal of the decision was based on a denial of a motion
brought by R.C.'s counsel to strike the petition against R.C. on
the ground that Penal Code section 11115 required corroboration
1. In re R. C., 39 Cal. App. 3d 887, 891, 114 Cal. Rptr. 735, 737 (1974),
hearing denied (August 28, 1974).
2. Id., 114 Cal. Rptr. 738.
3. CAL. PEN. CODE § 447a (West 1970) makes it illegal to set fire to a
dwelling house or other enumerated appurtenances thereto.
4. R. C.'s commitment was pursuant to CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 602
(West Supp. 1974), which provides in relevant part:
Any person who is under the age of 18 years when he violates any
law of this state . . . is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court,
which may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court.
5. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1111 (West 1970) states:
A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
of the stipulated testimony of D.B. and J.J., who were accomplices
in the offense charged against R.C.
In affirming the order of commitment, the court of appeal
held that Penal Code section 1111 does not by its own terms apply
to juvenile proceedings, and the principle expressed therein is not
required in such proceedings either as a matter of due process
or equal protection.6
Thus the judicial struggle over the appropriate method of
processing juvenile offenders through the juvenile justice system
continues. In recent years, courts at both the federal and state
levels have wrestled with conflicting theories of juvenile law.'
Simply stated, there are at opposite ends of the theoretical spec-
trum the "Purists"" and the "Constitutionalists." 9  The "Purists"
wholeheartedly endorse the social-welfare philosophy that the
state should act through the courts to deal with juvenile problems
in a practical, protective, and, consequently, informal capacity.
The "Constitutionalists" advocate full constitutional rights and pro-
cedural safeguards for minors. 10 Many decisions have stemmed
from a growing recognition that the attempt to treat juveniles who
act in violation of the law as delinquent children in a benevolent,
noncriminal atmosphere rather than as junior criminals has met
with only limited success." While the problem is still unresolved,
the trend has been toward a continuing integration of many of the
procedural rights accorded adult criminal defendants into the ad-
it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the
defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration
is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or
the circumstances thereof.
An accomplice is hereby defined as one who is liable to prosecution
for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the
case in which the testimony of the accomplice is given.
6. 39 Cal. App. 3d at 892-97, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 738-42.
7. See generally, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); T.N.G. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 767, 484 P.2d
981, 94 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1971); In re S.A., 6 Cal. App. 3d 241, 85 Cal. Rptr.
775 (1970).
8. Gardner, Gault and California, 19 HAST. L.J. 527 (1968).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543-44 (1971), the Court
stated:
We must recognize, as the Court has recognized before, that the fond
and idealistic hopes of the juvenile court proponents and early reformers
of three generations ago have not been realized. . . . Too often thejuvenile court judge falls far short of that stalwart, protective, and com-
municating figure the system envisaged. The community's unwillingness
to provide people and facilities and to be concerned, the insufficiency
of time devoted, the scarcity of professional help, the inadequacy of
dispositional alternatives, and our general lack of knowledge all con-
tribute to dissatisfaction with the experiment.
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judicative phase of juvenile proceedings where commitment is a
possible consequence. 2
Given this historical setting, the significance of In re R.C. as
a new watermark in the ebb and flow of statutory and judicial
changes in California law can now be considered.
The initial issue decided by the court of appeal was that Pe-
nal Code section 1111 did not expressly apply to juvenile wardship
proceedings. As viewed by the court, the point of controversy
was not the admissibility of the uncorroborated accomplice testi-
mony, 3 but the effect of that testimony once admitted. The opin-
ion of the majority was that
Penal Code section 1111 by its own terms applies only to
criminal convictions, while Welfare and Institutions Code sec-
tion 503 provides that an "order adjudging a minor to be a
ward of the juvenile court shall not be deemed a conviction of
a crime for any purpose, nor shall a proceeding in the juvenile
court be deemed a criminal proceeding. . . . To apply Penal
Code section 1111 to a juvenile proceeding would thus be
contrary to the intention expressed in the statute.
14
This statement illustrates the theoretical stance taken by the
majority of the court concerning procedural formalities in the juve-
nile courts. The notion, however, that juvenile proceedings are
totally noncriminal is certainly controversial. Although the view
posited by the majority here has prevailed in California,' 5 as juve-
nile courts adopt more procedural rules and formalities they tend
to resemble more and more their adult court counterparts. As
a result, the opposing view takes on ever-increasing significance.
The "Constitutionalists"' 6 would argue that an adjudication of
wardship, when based on a charge of committing an act that
amounts to a felony, for example arson, 17 is similar to an adult
criminal proceeding in terms of its "effect" on the convicted de-
fendant, and therefore should be characterized by similar pro-
cedural rules.
The idea that terming a wardship adjudication "civil" is a "le-
gal fiction" which does violence to reason and reality was first
enunciated in California in In re Contreras,'8 and received strong
12. Comment, Jury Trial for Juveniles, 23 HAST. L.J. 467, 480 (1972).
13. 39 Cal. App. 3d at 892, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 738.
14. Id. (emphasis by the court).
15. See In re S.A., 6 Cal. App. 3d 241, 85 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1970), where
the same reasoning was used to hold section 1203.4 of the Penal Code, providing
for the setting aside of a guilty verdict in the case of a defendant who has ful-
filled the conditions of probation, inapplicable to a minor as to whom juvenile
court jurisdiction had terminated.
16. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
17. CAL. PEN. CODE § 447a (West 1970).
18. 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 241 P.2d 631 (1952). The court said: "It is
1974]
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support in In re Mikkelson.19 In 1970, the California Supreme
Court in Joe Z. v. Superior Court20 concluded that juvenile pro-
ceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, involving "as they often do
the possibility of a substantial loss of personal freedom."'" Never-
theless, the In re R.C. majority chose to uphold the civil versus
criminal distinction between juvenile wardship adjudications and
adult criminal proceedings set forth in Welfare and Institutions
Code section 503.22 The adherence of the court to the theory
that the juvenile and adult systems of criminal justice are not the
same allowed it to find no need for an express application of the
accomplice testimony rule to a wardship proceeding. Having de-
cided that issue, the majority then faced the due process and equal
protection claims raised by the defendant.
In evaluating whether due process considerations require the
application of Penal Code section 1111 to juvenile wardship ad-judications, the court of appeal began by admitting that such pro-
ceedings "must comport with the essentials of due process and fair
'treatment."2  The court took the view that corroboration of ac-
complice testimony was not essential to due process in adult crim-
inal cases; therefore "it similarly is not required in juvenile
cases." '24 This reasoning requires further analysis.
At the outset it should be noted that all courts in our legal
system regard the testimony of an accomplice witness with some
degree of suspicion.2 5 This is because the accomplice may wish
to testify falsely in the hope of gaining some sort of immunity or
leniency, or to shield himself by ascribing his own or another's
acts to an innocent suspect, or to lie for purposes of revenge.2"
Corroboration of accomplice testimony is not required in federal
prosecutions,27 and the court of appeal further cites a concurring
opinion in -the New York decision, In re M., 2s which notes that
a "vast majority"29 of the states do not require it. This "vast ma-
common knowledge that such an adjudication . . . is a blight upon the character
of and is a serious impediment to the future of such minor." Id. at 789, 241
P.2d at 633; cf. In re Alexander, 152 Cal. App. 2d 458, 313 P.2d 182 (1957).
19. 226 Cal. App. 2d 467, 471, 38 Cal. Rptr. 106, 108 (1964).
20. 3 Cal. 3d 797, 801, 478 P.2d 26, 28, 91 Cal. Rptr. 594, 596 (1970).21. Id. The court refused, however, to go so far as to apply the same rules
of discovery to a juvenile case as would be applied in an adult criminal case.
22. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 503 (West 1972).
23. 39 Cal. App. 3d at 892, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 738, citing, In re Gault, 387U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
24. 39 Cal. App. 3d at 893, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 739.
25. Comment, Accomplice Corroboration-Its Status In California, 9
U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 190 (1962).
26. Id. at 192.
27. 39 Cal. App. 3d at 893, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 739, citing, United States
v. Honore, 450 F.2d 31, 34 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1048 (1971).
28. 34 App. Div. 2d 761, 310 N.Y.S.2d 399 (1970).
29. Id. at 763, 310 N.Y.S.2d at 401-02.
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jority" language is somewhat misleading.30 In twenty-one states
the rule that a felony conviction cannot be based solely on uncor-
roborated accomplice testimony is given either total or partial ap-
plication." Thus, the court of appeal's argument that California's
requirement that accomplice testimony be corroborated is not an
essential of due process even in adult criminal cases, but merely
a "legislative refinement,"32 is at least questionable in light of the
procedural rules adopted in several states. That the federal courts
do not apply the rule is, of course, a major countervailing consider-
ation.
In assessing the requisite due process applicable in specific
juvenile court procedures, the United States Supreme Court deci-
sion in In re Winship33 provides an analytical base. Winship held
that where a juvenile is charged with an act which would constitute
a crime if committed by an adult, due process requires the adjudi-
cation standard to be proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Su-
preme Court stated that judicial intervention into the life of a mi-
nor in order to attempt to rehabilitate him should not take "the
form of subjecting the child to the stigma of a finding that he vio-
lated a criminal law and to the possibility of institutional confine-
ment on proof insufficient to convict him were he an adult."34
The New York appellate court in In re M.3 1 interpreted Win-
ship to mean that full compliance with the due process require-
ment of establishing proof beyond a reasonable doubt necessitated
the application of New York's Code of Criminal Procedure, sec-
tion 399,0 to juvenile proceedings. The law in New York is very
30. The citation of authority given by the concurring judge is 7 WIGMoRE,
EVIDENCE § 2056 (3d ed. 1940). Yet section 2056, speaking of the corrobora-
tion doctrine, reads in pertinent part:
As a matter of common law, then, the doctrine was universally under-
stood (except by one or two courts) as amounting to no rule of evi-
dence, but merely to a counsel of caution given by the judge to the
jury. It followed that the jury might or might not regard the caution
by acquitting upon an uncorroborated accomplice's testimony ....
But in nearly half of the jurisdictions of the United States a statute
has expressly turned this cautionary practice into a rule of law. The
judge must therefore under these statutes instruct the jury in the rule
of law and the jury must follow it ....
Id. (emphasis added).
31. Id. at n.10.
32. 39 Cal. App. 3d at 893, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 739.
33. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
34. Id. at 367.
35. 34 App. Div. 2d 761, 310 N.Y.S.2d 399 (1970). In re M. and In re
R.C. both involved minors charged with arson offenses where the only available
evidence was uncorroborated accomplice testimony.
36. The New York Code of Criminal Procedure was replaced in its entirety
by the Criminal Procedure Law, which became effective September 1, 1971. How-
ever, the requirement that accomplice testimony be corroborated was not changed.
The new statute provides that "a defendant may not be 'convicted of any offense
upon the testimony of an accomplice unsupported by corroborative evidence tend-
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similar to California Penal Code section 1111 in relation to convic-
tions based solely on uncorroborated accomplice testimony. The
principle that corroborated accomplice testimony is an integral part
of due process in adjudications of juvenile delinquency continues
to be followed in New York.17 The In re R.C. court, relying in
part on the above-criticized concurring opinion in In re M.,
thought the Winship case ill-applied to the accomplice testimony
rule, and concluded that Penal Code section 1111 is not required
by due process."
Another Supreme Court case relevant to this discussion is
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,"9 in which the Court stated that the
due process standard applicable to juvenile court proceedings, as
developed by In re Gault4" and Winship, is "fundamental fair-
ness. ''41 As that standard was applied in those cases, there was
"an emphasis on fact finding procedures. The requirements of
notice, counsel, confrontation, cross-examination and standard of
proof naturally flowed from this emphasis."4  While McKeiver
went on to hold that the right to a jury trial is not a necessary
component of accurate fact finding and therefore not required injuvenile courts, this is important because the truth and credi-
bility of the sole testimony upon which a conviction is based is
an integral component of accurate fact finding. Since Penal Code
section 1111 fits within the fact finding category, this is another
indication that its use in juvenile proceedings is justified on due
process grounds.
Thus, the court of appeal's reasons for rejecting appellant's
due process argument in In re R.C. are not without counterpoints
worthy of consideration. With regard to the equal protection ar-
gument considered and rejected by the majority, Justice Rattigan
was in strong disagreement. 43
The thrust of the majority's argument was that the purposes,
needs, and characteristics of the adult and juvenile criminal sys-
tems are different;14 consequently, reasonable differences in pro-
cedure are justified so long as due process standards are met.
The lack of a jury trial in the juvenile court was used as an ex-
ample of the differences between the two systems which militate
ing to connect the defendant with the commission of such offense." N.Y. CRM.
PRO. LAW § 60.22 (McKinney 1971).
37. In re L., 41 App. Div. 2d 674, 340 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1973).
38. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
39. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
40. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
41. 403 U.S. at 543.
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. 39 Cal. App. 3d at 898-99, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 742-43 (Rattigan, 3., dis-
senting).
44. ld. at 894, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 739.
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against the equal protection argument. The court argued that "it
is not unreasonable to suppose that a judge conducting a juvenile
hearing is less likely than a jury would be to accept accomplice
testimony uncritically."45 Another disparity noted was the relative
severity of the possible consequences of an adult court conviction
compared with an adjudication of delinquency.46
While the argument concerning the jury-judge dichotomy ap-
pears reasonable, the comparison of the severity of possible con-
sequences is of marginal validity. Granted, a juvenile perpetrator
of an act equivalent to a serious felony will not be subjected to
the harsh maximum sentences faced by an adult perpetrator, but
as the court of appeal itself noted, "[t]he peculiarities of the juvenile
commitment process may cause a juvenile offender to be confined
longer than one prosecuted as an adult for the same conduct
"47
In dissent, Justice Rattigan was of the opinion that the ma-
jority's justification of the differences in the systems, solely upon
the basis that due process standards have been satisfied, ignored
the affected juvenile's right to equal protection of the laws.48 The
dissenting justice characterized the majority's reasons for uphold-
ing the different treatment accorded to juveniles as being based
on one or both of the following alternative premises:
(1) . . . a contrary holding would subvert the essential dif-
ference between juvenile and adult prosecutions as adversary
procedings . . . ; or (2) . . . the specific, disparate treat-
ment in question otherwise operated to serve the best interests
of the affected juvenile or of the system of juvenile justice
generally. 49
These reasons were then distinguished as they related to Penal
Code section 1111. Justice Rattigan did not feel that requiring
corroboration of accomplice testimony would raise juvenile pro-
ceedings to the adversary plateau of adult criminal prosecutions,
nor that refusal to apply the statute in any way served the best
interests of the juvenile or the system through which he is pro-
cessed.50
The first of the dissent's arguments appears to be especially
meritorious. The majority's view that an application of Penal
Code section 1111 would tend toward formality and an adversary
atmosphere carries little weight when considered in relation to all
45. Id. at 895, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 740.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 898, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 742.
49. Id. at 898-99, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 742-43 (citations omitted).
50. ld. at 899, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 743.
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of the procedural rules applied thus far to juvenile proceedings.5'
The right to counsel, notice, confrontation, appeal, and -the priv-
ileges against self-incrimination, double jeopardy, and the many
others recognized in California's juvenile justice system make for
a system that is laced with formality and the clamor of adversary
proceedings. In light of this, the argument that the juvenile sys-
tem can still be characterized as "civil" or even "quasi-criminal"
is eroded.
The dissent's second argument goes to the very heart of the
"Purist" vs. "Constitutionalist" debate over the proper treatment
of juvenile offenders. 2 According to McKeiver v. Pennsyl-
vania, the juvenile court system contemplates fairness, concern,
sympathy and paternal attention for its subjects." But whether it
approximates that ideal in practice is another consideration. 4
Applying this consideration to Penal Code section 1111, it seemsproper to ask whether its application will in any way serve to rem-
edy the present defects in the juvenile system. Quite possibly
the fact finding function would be insured of more accuracy by
requiring corroboration of accomplice testimony. But use of the
rule would at the same time result in a diminution of the juvenile
court's ability to experiment in dealing with the problems of the
young. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in In re Winship, argues
that the already much-formalized juvenile system should not befurther strait-jacketed with more procedural rules.55 He posits the
notion that the procedural trend is actually a protest against inade-
quate juvenile court staffs and facilities. Because of the literalbreakdown in many juvenile courts, he states that -the judicial reac-
tion has been to "burn down the stable to get rid of the mice ...
51. In a juvenile wardship proceeding under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 602, a minor is protected by the following procedural rights and safe-guards: right to be advised of constitutional rights, CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE§ 627.5 (West 1972); right to counsel, Id. §§ 633-34, 679; right to notice of
charges, Id. § 633; right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, Id. §§ 630,702.5 (West Supp. 1974); privilege against self-incrimination, Id.; right to appeal,Id. § 800 (West 1972); protection against double jeopardy, Id. § 606; violation
of a criminal statute must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, Id. § 701. SeeIn re Robert T., 8 Cal. App. 3d 990, 88 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1970) (exclusionary
rules relating to illegally seized evidence); In re Carl T., 1 Cal. App. 3d 344,81 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1969) (unconstitutional pretrial identification procedures);
In re Michael M., 11 Cal. App. 3d 741, 96 Cal. Rptr. 887 (1970) (rights mustbe explicitly waived prior to a judicial admission); In re Roderick P., 7 Cal.3d 801, 500 P.2d 1, 103 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1972) (statements obtained in violation
of Miranda are inadmissible). See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)
aind -text ccorfipanying notes 25-26 supra. These and other rights were citedby the In re R.C. court. 39 Cal. App; 3d-at 896-97, 114 Cal. Rptr. at.741-
42.
52. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
53. 403 U.S. at 550.
54. See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
55. 397 U.S. at 376 (dissenting opinion).
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Constitutional problems were not seen while those courts func-
tioned in an atmosphere where juvenile judges were not crushed
with an avalanche of cases.""8
Will more money, more courts and more specialized juvenile
judges make up for the deficiencies in the present system which
conceivably brought on the outcry for procedural safeguards?
This question, as well as whether the stable of juvenile justice is
being burned down or is actually being renovated into a more vi-
able structure by the continuing application of these protections
cannot be definitively answered. One clear fact, however, is that
California has long been a front-runner in providing procedural
protections for minors.57  The gap between equal procedural
rights for juveniles and adults is closing. But the court of appeal
in In re R.C. has chosen, for the present, not to move any further
in that direction.
Timothy R. Patterson
56. Id.
57. Comment, The Conflict of Parens Patriae and Constitutional Concepts
of Juvenile Justice, 6 LINCOLN L. REv. 65 (1970).
1974]
SECURITY TRANSACTIONS-"ONE FORM OF ACTION"
RULE IS APPLICABLE TO MORTGAGES AND DEEDS OF
TRUST SECURED BY A COMBINATION OF REAL AND
PERSONAL PROPERTY-Walker v. Community Bank, 10 Cal.
3d 729, 518 P.2d 329, 111 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1974).
In July, 1965, Diversified Enterprises Incorporated borrowed$153,946 from the Community Bank, returning one promissory
note for that amount secured by a chattel mortgage on equipment
and trucks owned by Diversified, and as additional security a
promissory note for $40,000 secured by a deed of trust on certain
real property. Upon Diversified's default, the bank commenced
an action to judicially foreclose' upon the chattel mortgage, pur-
suant to section 9501 of the California Commercial Code.2 At
this time Diversified sold to one Glen Walker the real property
securing the $40,000 note. The bank commenced foreclosure
upon the real property by recording notice of default and election
to sell under the power of sale provided in the deed of trust. La-
ter, a deficiency judgment of $93,570.83 requesting the unpaid
balance on the $153,946 note was awarded to the bank followingjudicial foreclosure and sale of the chattels.
The plaintiff brought suit to quiet title in the real property
and enjoin the trustee's sale. Although the superior court granted
a temporary injunction staying the sale, it later dissolved the in-junction and awarded title in the real property to the defendant
bank. The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed. On appeal
to the California Supreme Court plaintiff Walker contended that
the bank was barred from resorting to its real property security
by the "one form of action" rule,3 set forth in section 726 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure, requiring judicial foreclosure
of all security for a single debt within a single action.4 The court,
in Walker v. Community Bank,5 reversed the lower court on the
ground that the respondent had made an election to judicially fore-
close separately on the personal property collateral and conse-
1. CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 725(a) (West 1955) authorizes use of judicialforeclosure by the mortgagee or the beneficiary or trustee of a deed of trust.
2. CAL. COMM. CODE § 9501 (West 1964).
3. Walker v. Community Bank, 10 Cal. 3d 729, 733-34, 518 P.2d 329, 331,
111 Cal. Rptr. 897, 899 (1974).
4. CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 726 (West Supp. 1974) reads in relevant part:There can be but one form of action for the recovery of any debt,
or the enforcement of any right secured by mortgage upon real property,
which action must be in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
5. 10 Cal. 3d 729, 518 P.2d 329, 111 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1974).
SECURITY TRANSACTIONS
quently had waived its right to proceed against the real property
security interest.6
Prior to 1963, section 726 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure applied to both real and personal property security, re-
quiring a creditor to combine all actions involving security for a
single debt into a single judicial foreclosure before he could pur-
sue any additional remedies such as a deficiency judgment. 7  This
was known as the "one form of action" rule, developed by the
Legislature to protect mortgagors from costly multiple suits upon
separate portions of security for a single debt, as well as to make
the security the primary source of satisfaction for a debt.8  The
rule applies to deeds of trust as well as mortgages. 9 In 1963 the
Legislature amended section 726,10 deleting the reference to per-
sonal property and making the provisions of that section applicable
solely to security transactions involving any real property.
1
'
At the same time the Legislature enacted the California
Commercial Code. 12  Section 9501 of the Code prescribes cred-
itors' enforcement procedures for a debt in default which must be
followed in situations where personal property constitutes the only
form of security.' 3 Noticeably absent is any limitation to a single
form of action.
The issue before the Walker court was whether the amend-
ment of section 726 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the con-
current enactment of section 9501 of the California Commercial
Code made section 726, as revised, applicable to security agree-
ments involving personal and real property. Specifically, if a
creditor judicially forecloses upon personal property within section
9501 of the Commercial Code and obtains a deficiency judgment,
can he then proceed to a separate foreclosure upon the untouched
6. Id. at 741, 518 P.2d at 337, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
7. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 726 (West Supp. 1974) applies to judicial fore-
closures. Before a creditor can obtain a deficiency judgment he must also escape
the sanction of the antideficiency statutes. Section 580(b) of the California Code
of Civil Procedure prohibits deficiency judgments on purchase mortgages and land
sale contracts. Section 580(d) prohibits deficiency judgments following non-ju-
dicial sales of property.
8. Comment, Mortgages and Trust Deeds: When Foreclosure is Required
under Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 726: Counterclaim and Set Of When One Claim is
Secured, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 347, 348 (1937).
9. Bank of Italy Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Bentley, 217 Cal. 644, 650,
20 P.2d 940, 945 (1933).
10. Cal. Stats. (1963), ch. 819, § 26, at 2007 (effective Jan. 1, 1965).
11. 10 Cal. 3d 729, 735, 518 P.2d 329, 332-33, 111 Cal. Rptr. 897, 900-
01 (1974).
12. Cal. Stats. (1963), ch. 819, § 1, at 1849 (effective Jan. 1, 1965).
13. CAL. COMM. CODE § 9501 (West 1964) provides in part: "The creditor
may reduce his claim to judgment, foreclose or otherwise enforce the security
interest by any judicial procedure."
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real property security through private sale, without running afoul
of the "one form of action" rule?
The court found that deletion of the words "personal prop-
erty" from section 726 makes its provisions applicable only to se-
curity arrangements involving some real property, whereas the en-
actment of section 9501 brings enforcement of purely personalproperty within the exclusive province of the Commercial Code. 4As to the hybrid case where the collateral for a debt is both real
and personal property the court focused upon subdivision (4) of
section 9501.15 In its reading of that subdivision' the Walker
court found that a creditor can "elect to proceed solely as to thepersonal property under the Commercial Code,"17 but that if he
wishes to protect both real and personal property security "he mustdo so according to the rights and remedies accorded real property
security and not pursuant to the Commercial Code."' 8  In effectthe court held that the "one form of action" rule is applicable inCalifornia where the security for a single debt is both real and
personal property.'
Why was the Walker court so concerned with preserving the
applicability of section 726 to proceedings involving combined real
and personal property security? One justification for the court'sdesire to retain a broadly effective statute was the concern ex-pressed by Professor Hetland-the prevention of a multiplicity of
suits. 20  More importantly, however, the court seems to have
14. 10 Cal. 3d at 734-35, 518 P.2d at 332-33, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 900-01.15. CAL. COMM. CODE § 9501(4) (West 1964) reads:If the security agreement covers both real and personal property,the secured party may proceed under this chapter as to the personalproperty or he may proceed as to both the real and personal propertyin accordance with his rights and remedies in respect of the real prop-erty in which case the provisions of this chapter do not apply.16. The court's interpretation is based largely upon the comments to the Cal-ifornia Commercial Code. CAL. C MM. CODE § 9501, Comment 5 (West 1964)
states in part:
The collateral for many corporate security issues consists of realand personal property. In the interest of simplicity and speed subsection(4) permits, although it does not require, the secured party to proceedas to both real and personal property in accordance with his rights andremedies in respect of the real property. Except for the permissionso granted, this Act leaves to other state law all questions of procedurewith respect to real property. For example, this Act does not determinewhether the secured party can proceed against the real estate alone andlater proceed in a separate action against the personal property in ac-cordance with his rights and remedies against the real property.17. 10 Cal. 3d at 735, 518 P.2d at 332, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 900.18. Id. (Emphasis in original).
19. The court relied heavily upon Professor Hetland's assessment of the ap-plicability of the rule in the combined real-personal property security situation.Id. at 733 n.2, 518 P.2d at 332 n.2, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900 n.2. See HET-LAND, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE SECURED TRANSACTIONS § 6.18, at 257-58 (Cont.Ed. Bar 1970) [hereinafter cited as HETLAND].
20. See HETLAND, supra note 19, § 6.18, at 257.
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reasoned that, given the nature of security agreements within the
typical commercial context, a borrower should be afforded a greater
measure of protection than a lender. The Walker court appar-
ently felt this policy to be the basic import of section 726 and
doubtless was loathe to chisel away the debtor's protection in favor
of enhancing the creditor's convenience in enforcing his security
interests.21
After finding section 726 to be applicable to the case, the
court applied the guidelines set forth in James v. P.C.S. Ginning
Co. 22  In that case the mortgagee had elected the remedy of a
personal judgment in satisfaction of the mortgagor's debt. The
James court held that the equitable lien priority over real property
security had been waived under the "one form of action" rule and
that the mortgagee was consequently barred from foreclosure of
its lien.23
Utilizing this reasoning the Walker court held that the "one
form of action" rule embodied in section 726 prohibits a creditor
from obtaining a personal judgment against his debtor and then
proceeding in a separate action against the real property.24 The
proper form, said the court, would be to proceed against the real
property before seeking any additional remedy through personal
judgment.25
The protection extended to the debtor operates in two ways.
First, the mortgagor may set up section 726 as an affirmative de-
fense26 compelling the mortgagee to exhaust all security before
seeking a deficiency judgment and, at the same time, barring any
other form of judicial action.27 In the case at hand the mortgagor,
Diversified Enterprises, waived such a defense.28 Under the rule
of James v. P.C.S. Ginning Co.,29 such a waiver results in the pro-
visions of the statute operating as a sanction, 0 automatically bar-
21. If a creditor were allowed to foreclose partially upon his security he
would then be in a position to take advantage of market values in land by fore-
closing at the most opportunistic times.
22. 276 Cal. App. 2d 19, 80 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1969).
23. Id. at 23, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 460. The mortgagee ginning company had
retained both a chattel mortgage and an equitable lien on real property as se-
curity. Upon default it obtained a personal judgment for the balance against
the mortgagor after which the mortgagor filed a homestead upon the land.
24. 10 Cal. 3d at 741, 518 P.2d at 337, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
25. Id.
26. HETLAND, supra note 19, § 6.18, at 243.
27. Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 59 Cal. 2d 35, 38, 378 P.2d 97, 98, 27
Cal. Rptr. 873, 874 (1963).
28. The benefits of section 726 as an affirmative defense for the mortgagor
may be waived after the loan contract is made. See Salter v. Ulrich, 22 Cal.
2d 263, 267, 138 P.2d 7, 9 (1943).
29. 276 Cal. App. 2d 19, 23, 80 Cal. Rptr. 457, 460 (1969).
30. See HETLAND, supra note 19, § 6.18, at 243.
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ring foreclosure by the mortgagee of any remaining real property
security once he obtains a personal judgment against the mort-
gagor. Here, plaintiff Walker was the windfall recipient of the
protection of the statute's sanction aspect."' Although he pur-
chased title to the realty with full knowledge of the outstanding
trust deed,"' he was permitted to invoke this sanction, preventing
the bank from foreclosing upon the real property, because through
election, it had "waived all right to such security.""3
Section 726, then, remains a powerful weapon in a debtor's
arsenal. Although he may compel a creditor to satisfy a defaulted
obligation by foreclosing upon all of the security first, 34 he need
not do so. Often it may be to his advantage to waive the affirm-
ative defense, since the sanction aspect of the statute will then
protect any outstanding real property security which an unwary
creditor may have neglected to foreclose upon in the initial action.
If the creditor neglects to foreclose upon the real property he then
loses the balance of the debt as well as the security.35  The
Walker result is unfavorable to such a creditor,8 6 but it gives him
fair notice that the "one form of action" rule is not dead letter
in situations where the security for an obligation is both real and
personal property.
The practical impact of Walker, beyond the preservation of
section 726's debtor protection in combined real and personal
property situations, may be that institutional lenders will extend
fewer mortgages involving some real property security.3 7 Loan
amounts for these mortgages may decrease. At the same time,
interest rates on such transactions may increase as those creditors
involved in judicial foreclosures are forced to rely for their security
primarily upon land, which may be of relatively little value 3  in
satisfying a debtor's obligation. 9 Wary lenders, spurred to protect
themselves through more extensive security and personal credit
31. 10 Cal. 3d at 739 n.4, 518 P.2d at 335-36 n.4, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 903-
04 n.4.
32. Walker v. Community Bank, 31 Cal. App. 3d 380, 107 Cal. Rptr. 345,350 (1973), vacated by, Walker v. Community Bank, 10 Cal. 3d 729, 518 P.2d
329, 111 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1974).
33. 10 Cal. 3d at 741, 518 P.2d at 337, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
34. HETLAND, supra note 19, § 6.18, at 243.
35. Id.
36. See Kendall, Effect of the One Action Rule on Real Property Security
Interests, 44 L.A. BAR BULL. 116, 136-44 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Kendall].
37. Id. at 144.
38. Id. at 136.
39. Where the creditor is a junior lienor, however, he will not be barred
from a deficiency judgment by section 726 where the land has been rendered
valueless by a senior sale. Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 59 Cal. 2d 35, 40-
41, 378 P.2d 97, 100, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873, 876 (1963).
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evaluation, 40 will no doubt include more restrictive stipulations in
loan contracts, such as due-on-sale provisions." Innovative fi-
nancing devices for real-personal property mortgages, such as
combinations of mortgages and unsecured loans,42 which previ-
ously enabled lending institutions to make at least some relatively
safe loans, may now be discouraged. The net result of Walker
may well be that there will be less borrowed money circulating
in the California economy, at least where these loans are secured
in part by real property.
In its reading of the Commercial Code the California Su-
preme Court extended the protection given a mortgagor by section
726 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The commercial ramifications
of Walker, however, may be more important to the prospective
borrower in an already tight money market than the procedural
safeguard of the "one form of action" rule.
John Harvey Patton
40. See Kendall, supra note 36, at 138, 144.
41. Cherry v. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 579-80, 81
Cal. Rptr. 135, 138-39 (1969). However, a due-on-sale clause will be enforced
by the courts only where the beneficiary-obligee can demonstrate a threat to his
security sufficient to justify such a restraint on alienation. Tucker v. Lassen
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 638-40, 526 P.2d 1169, 1174-76, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 633, 638-40 (1974).
42. Some writers have suggested that the lender make two loans when the
security is inadequate to cover the lender's risk. One loan is made for the amount
of the security and is secured, while the other loan is equivalent to the balance
and is unsecured. This method avoids subordination to other general creditors
as to any amount outstanding after resort to the security. See Brown, Preventive
Law: The Divided Loan, 36 CAL. ST. B.J. 81 (1961).
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